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 Abstract
This article summarises and discusses eight case studies from  Mexico, 
Argentina, Bolivia, Pakistan, India and Nepal that focus on the everyday 
realities of decentralisation. It recalls the mainstream arguments favour-
ing decentralisation as a basic human right (i.e. to be able to participate in 
decision-making) and in a more utilitarian sense (i.e. decentralisation for 
development). The eight case studies support aspects of the mainstream; 
however, they also present new insights. To position these insights, the 
article deconstructs mainstream decentralisation discourses as based on a 
functionalist ontology, often leading to rather managerial and mechanistic 
approaches. To contrast such a functionalist position, three critical social 
science perspectives are introduced: the neo-Marxist view of the hegem-
onic state (including the notion of subalterns), Scott’s simplifying state tech-
niques, and Midgal’s state-in-society approach. A reading of the case stud-
ies in this context highlights that decentralisation programmes often follow 
standardised procedures that encounter social, political, economic and eco-
logical local complexities. Dimensions of these complexities are: already 
ongoing contestations among social groups; conflicting expectations upon, 
and interpretations of, the meaning of decentralisation; and strategic han-
dling of decentralisation as a resource – highlighting the importance of 
agency. The article concludes with the proposition that decentralisation is 
not primarily a managerial challenge (i.e. to introduce improved governance 
mechanisms), but is inherently political, influenced by interests and agency, 
and thus contingent. The challenge for researchers and practitioners is to 
support adequate social processes that allow decentralisation to give local 
complexities more room, without fuelling local competition over the scarce 
resources offered by decentralisation.
Keywords: Decentralisation; local complexity; social movements; partici-
pation; agency and contingency; natural resource management.s
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1.1 The issue
Since the last decade of the twentieth century, many countries have 
pursued new mechanisms to promote more direct citizen engage-
ment in the processes of governance, ranging from the creation of 
new decentralised institutions, to a wide variety of participatory 
and consultative processes in national and global policy delibera-
tions. (Gaventa 2002) 
Indeed, decentralisation has become an important field of debate for both 
development practitioners and development researchers. The above quote 
highlights several core notions constituting this particular field of engage-
ment with development, e.g. ‘citizens’, ‘mechanisms’, ‘governance’, ‘par-
ticipatory and consultative processes’, ‘policy delibera tions’ and last but 
not least ‘countries’ (or states for that matter). 
The notion of ‘decentralisation’ generally refers to a shift in government 
from rather centralised, state-controlled regimes to more decentred arrange-
ments based on local forms of governance.3 The most common differentia-
tions of the various types of decentralisation include (Manor 2000) decon-
centration or administrative decentralisation (“the dispersal of agents of 
higher levels of government into lower-level arenas”), fiscal decentrali-
sation (“the downward transfer of decision-making powers over funds to 
lower levels”) and devolution or democratic decentralisation (“the down-
ward transfer of resources and powers [and often, tasks] to lower-level 
authorities which are in some way democratic”). In practice, different com-
binations of these three types of decentralisation are often found. In recent 
years it is especially the idea of ‘devolution’ that has gained momentum. 
Local (and locally elected) authorities have been enabled to represent local 
citizens’ needs and concerns, and to demand services from higher levels of 
administration. Devolution is also seen as an important mechanism for mak-
ing the management of natural resources more sustainable. By handing over 
responsibilities regarding access control and use rights (at times based on 
the legal recognition of existing ‘customary’ rights) in territorial planning 
and management to local governments, decentralisation aims at finding a 
better balance between exploitation and conservation of natural resources 
(Andersson 2003; Larson 2003; Larson and Ribot 2004). 
As in many other spheres of the debate about development, the positions 
on the importance, relevance and effectiveness of decentralisation differ 
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widely. On the one hand, decentralisation is portrayed as a core ingredient to 
overcome poverty. Most prominent in this respect is the World Bank, which 
already some time ago perceived decentralisation as an important comple-
mentarity to (economic) globalisation: “Localisation is praised for raising 
levels of participation and involvement, and providing people with a greater 
ability to shape the context of their own lives. By leading to decentralised 
government where more decisions happen at sub national levels, closer to 
the voters, localisation can result in more responsive and efficient local gov-
ernance” (World Bank 2000, p iii).4
On the other hand, the World Bank is aware of potential difficulties too: 
“However, when poorly designed, decentralisation can result in overbur-
dened local governments without the resources or the capacity to fulfil their 
basic responsibilities of providing local infrastructure and services. It can 
also threaten macroeconomic stability, if local governments, borrowing 
heavily and spending unwisely, need to be bailed out by the national govern-
ment” (World Bank 2000, p iii). Others, though, criticise decentralisation 
more radically. They perceive decentralisation as a new -‘ism’ or dogma of 
the international development regime which serves as a clever manoeuvre to 
reduce the role of the state, externalise social and ecological costs or facili-
tate the implementation of an extractive ‘economy of enclave’ in Southern 
countries for the exploitation of natural resources such as oil, gas, minerals, 
timber or water (Orozco et al 2006). 
This often polarised debate reminds us of the famous dichotomy sketched by 
Robert Chambers long ago, when he characterised development discourses 
as entangled between “two cultures” (Chambers 1983, pp 29f.), the negative 
academics and the positive practitioners. With this edited volume, we aim 
to go beyond dichotomisation, by presenting a differentiated reading of the 
intentions as well as the actual experiences of endeavours that are described 
as decentralisation. This volume brings together empirical insights from 
actual practices of decentralisation in South Asia (Pakistan, India, Nepal) 
and Latin America (Mexico, Bolivia, Argentina) to substantiate, challenge 
and raise new questions regarding approaches and positions in debates on 
decentralisation.5 These case studies not only help us to illustrate the many 
forms decentralisation can take, but they also invite us to engage in critical 
reflection on what ‘decentralisation’ – as a societal practice – is meant to be 
and how it is experienced by various stakeholders. This reflection necessi-
tates a careful discussion of the core notions that constitute decentralisation 
and the normative expectations related to it.
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Our critical discussion on decentralisation, however, does not prevent us 
from taking the efforts by practitioners of development (the “operational 
personnel”, SDC 2007a, p 2) seriously and examining them with academic 
interest. In section 1.2, we therefore recall the main arguments used in favour 
of decentralisation, as well as the challenges mentioned by practitioners. In 
section 1.3, we provide brief summaries of the eight case studies that are 
brought together in this volume. These case studies show, in a variety of 
ways, the various forms decentralisation can take, as well as the complexi-
ties decentralisation encounters. 
Inspired by the findings of the case studies, section 1.4 embarks on a critical 
reflection on the core notions and concepts that constitute the mainstream 
discourse of decentralisation, using the methodology of deconstruction. 
This refers to an attempt to understand and critically review the notions, 
concepts and beliefs (ontology) that underpin ongoing mainstream discus-
sions on decentralisation – ‘beliefs’ because core notions that underpin these 
discussions are often taken for granted. A central assumption is the notion 
of ‘the state’, and linked to that ‘citizens’, with ‘governance’ as the activity 
that connects the two. Closely interwoven with the notions of ‘state’ and 
‘citizens’ are fundamental questions about their respective roles in defin-
ing ‘development’, and the inherent relationship between human actors and 
their ‘natural environment’. The focus on decentralisation at the local level 
also calls for attention. Although it is clear that the local level is at the core of 
the debate, it is also true that the bulk of decentralisation models currently in 
place are rather top-down initiatives taken by the international development 
community together with (central) governments. The critical reflection in 
section 1.4 also interlinks the specific notion of decentralisation with recent 
scholarly findings on state–people–society relations. 
Finally, section 1.5 brings together what we consider the main insights 
emerging from the case studies presented in this volume, based on a set of 
new questions that attempt to position the mainstream discourse and prac-
tice of decentralisation in a broader understanding of societal processes, and 
to reconstruct its meanings in a broader political context. As a normative 
point of departure for this discussion, we refer back to the key notion that 
underlies the argument for decentralisation, i.e. that all people are to have the 
capabilities for a good, meaningful and secure life (cf. e.g. Sen 1999). These 
capabilities include the right to participate in decision-making processes that 
concern the lives and livelihoods of people. The leading question, then, is not 
whether decentralisation is good or bad, but under which conditions it con-
tributes to or even hinders the realisation of such fundamental rights.
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1.2  Mainstream views on decentralisation
The idea to involve common people in decision-making processes that 
relate their lives to the construction and shaping of the public sphere through 
administration or ‘governance’ is not new; it has precedents in colonial as 
well as early postcolonial times (for South Asia see e.g. Corbridge et al 2005, 
for Latin America see Wachtel 1977 and Korovkin 2001).6 
Within dominant development discourses, however, ‘people’s participation’ 
received a new impetus from the 1980s onwards. ‘Projects’ being a central 
arrangement to practise development, ‘participatory’ endeavours started to 
boom worldwide within regionally and temporally confined project designs. 
Major fields of application were (integrated) rural development projects 
and specifically projects related to natural resource use. Under the notion of 
CBNRM (community-based natural resource management), attempts were 
made to organise local people around CBOs (community-based organisa-
tions), i.e. groups striving for community-based arrangements of accessing, 
controlling and sharing benefits from ‘commons’ such as forests, pastures or 
water (e.g. Poffenberger and McGean 1996). Many of these schemes were 
related to the interest in the local governance of common goods and services 
that re-emerged with the growing popularity of New Institutional Econom-
ics (e.g. Ostrom 1990; Anderies et al 2003). 
By the second half of the 1990s, there was a gradual shift from project-
level interventions towards a broadening of participatory processes as part 
of state-level initiatives (partly through ‘scaling-up’), to include political 
decision-making at large. As Ribot (2002, p 5) remarks (see also Brown et 
al 2002; Gaventa 2002, p 3): “Democratic decentralisation reforms present 
the opportunity to move from a project-based approach toward legally insti-
tutionalised popular participation. [This constitutes] a shift from externally 
orchestrated direct forms of democratic inclusion to representative forms of 
democracy under elected local authorities.” 
This coincided with wider debates within development circles on the effec-
tiveness of the state. The growing disenchantment with development, due to 
the non-achievement of development goals, was causally related to weak-
nesses of the state – the inefficiency of ‘service delivery’, at times corrup-
tion and social unrest, and the related crisis of state legitimacy in the eyes of 
its ‘citizens’. A growing (Washington) consensus emerged that there was a 
need to restructure the (central) state from being a key player in development 
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to becoming a provider of ‘enabling conditions’. Good governance became 
a key notion, in which “citizens can have a more active role” (Gaventa 2002, 
p 3), and which should “increase legitimacy [of the state] in view of its 
 citizens” (SDC 2008, p 1). We will critically re-visit all these notions below. 
There are many definitions of good governance. Many, though, include the 
demand for decentralisation, linking the latter with other demands for state 
reform such as democratisation, participatory development, accountabil-
ity of public servants, professionalism (Corbridge 2008, p 116), as well as 
transparency, non-discrimination and efficiency (SDC 2007a). Good gov-
ernance, however, continues to be based on the broad consensus among 
development circles that “the state plays a key role in determining the rules 
of the game, enforcing those rules, and in making its resources available to 
the entire population” (SDC 2007a, p 4).
The need for interventions towards decentralisation – as a component of 
good governance – is generally justified on two grounds, (i) because being 
an active and fully recognised citizen is a basic human right, and (ii) as a 
precondition for development. The rights-based approach “implies the idea 
of responsible citizens with rights and obligations as well as the idea of a 
state with obligations regarding respect, protection, and the realisation of 
its citizens’ rights” (SDC 2007a, p 8). In a more utilitarian sense, decentrali-
sation is expected to foster development more successfully than it was the 
case when the central state was in control. Manor (2000) puts this idea into 
a nutshell: 
Decentralisation enhances the uptake on and thus the impact of 
health, education and environmental programmes. It does so part-
ly by making it possible to adapt such programmes to local condi-
tions and preferences. It also provides a framework that facilitates 
‘scaling up’ – that is, replicating developmental successes from one 
local arena in many others. It has only limited utility in alleviating 
poverty (in many but not all contexts), and in promoting economic 
growth and mobilising local financial resources. But by opening the 
policy and political processes to ordinary people, it can do much to 
enhance their well being and to make their livelihoods and develop-
ment more sustainable.
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Other arguments in favour of decentralisation include (e.g. SDC 2001; 
Ribot 2002; SDC 2008) proximity to local needs (needs-based utilisation of 
public resources); linking with local knowledge, institutions and organisa-
tions; increased opportunities for accountability; improved service delivery; 
etc. Decentralisation figures prominently in the development programmes 
of many national governments and in the agendas of bi- and multilateral 
donors. An array of measures are taken in this regard, e.g. providing legal 
frameworks for decentralisation (including the clarification of responsi-
bilities at different politico-administrative levels), building political struc-
tures, providing knowledge or supporting sectorial project implementation 
through decentralised structures. 
‘Decentralisation’ having been a laboratory of developmental experiments 
(in situ) for a number of years now, an important debate has emerged on 
questions of ‘best practices’, and thus on factors that ensure the success of 
well-intended interventions towards decentralisation. As this ‘capitalisation 
of experience’ is a major contemporary concern of many donors, we will give 
some space to the arguments produced in this context. We indeed feel that 
they bring together many of the points experienced by development prac-
titioners, and thus form important components of the ongoing mainstream 
discourse. Any critical analysis such as the one we attempt in this volume 
needs to engage with these arguments.
We refer to the study by Ribot (2002), which is based on an analysis of 
decentralisation-related projects from around the globe. This capitalisation 
of insights leads Ribot to postulate nine “principles for effective decentrali-
sation” (2002, pp 3f.): 
1)  Work with local democratic institutions: “Governments, donors, and 
NGOs can foster local accountability by (1) choosing to work with and 
build on elected local governments where they exist [instead of working 
through project-based groups], (2) insisting on and encouraging their cre-
ation elsewhere, (3) encouraging electoral processes that admit independ-
ent candidates (since most do not), and (4) applying multiple accountabil-
ity measures to all institutions making public decisions.”
2)  Transfer of sufficient and appropriate powers: This includes executive 
(decision-making and implementation), legislative (rule-making) and judi-
ciary (dispute-resolution) powers. These powers need to be clearly defined, 
and guidelines “are needed to assure an effective separation and balance of 
executive, legislative, and judiciary powers in the local arena”.
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3)  Transfer of powers as secure rights: “To encourage local institutions 
and people to invest in new arrangements (...), governments should use 
secure means to transfer powers to local authorities. Secure transfers can 
create the space for local people to engage their representatives as citi-
zens.”
4)  Support equity and justice: For effective decentralisation, central gov-
ernments remain important “for redressing inequities and preventing elite 
capture of public decision-making processes. Central government also 
must establish the enabling legal environment for organizing, represen-
tation, rights, and recourse so that local people can demand government 
responsibility, equity, and justice for themselves.” Central governments 
should also ensure “pro-poor, pro-minority action”. 
5)  Establishing minimum environmental standards: This point refers to 
decentralisation related to natural resource use. A key argument produced 
by central authorities resisting decentralisation is the fear of resource 
overexploitation by local people. This concern has to be taken seriously, 
as there “is no reason to expect that local authorities will not convert natu-
ral wealth into financial wealth, especially where cash is in short supply 
and is viewed as more valuable than standing forests” (Ribot 2002, p 9). 
Central governments have to establish parameters within which manage-
ment by local authorities can take place.7 
6)  Establish fair and accessible adjudication: The re-definition of the 
‘rules of the game’ calls for parallel developments in the field of rule 
enforcement: “Governments should establish accessible independent 
courts, channels of appeal outside of the government agencies involved 
(...), and local dispute resolution mechanisms.”
7)  Support local civic education: Re-defined rules and enforcement mech-
anisms need to be known: “Governments, donors, and NGOs can inform 
people of their rights, write laws in clear and accessible language, and 
translate legal texts into local languages to encourage popular engage-
ment and local government responsibility. (...) Educating local authori-
ties of their rights and responsibilities can also foster responsible local 
governance.”
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8)  Give decentralisation time: All too often, experiments of decentralisa-
tion are not allowed to continue until they may be assessed based on their 
actual performance – changing the rules of the game takes time. 
9)  Develop indicators for monitoring & evaluating decentralisation 
and its outcomes: Decentralisation processes need to be accompanied 
by research in order to provide evidence-based feedback on enabling and 
hindering factors.
These nine points listed by Ribot are supported by many other capitalising 
endeavours (e.g. Bergh 2004). Read differently, these propositions also carry 
potential risks. In case the above conditions of success are not met, decen-
tralisation is prone to failure. Indeed, many studies emerging from main-
stream development circles point out such failures. Issues raised include 
lack of efficiency, corruption, elite capture or weak local capacity (Bergh 
2004, pp 781f.), lack of political will at the centre (SDC 2001, p 10), risk of 
fiscal equalisation inasmuch as poorer regions might lose out, lack of long-
term commitment of donors and their aid harmonisation (SDC 2007b, p 18), 
etc. At times, hints are also given as to the role of power: “Decentralisation 
projects have in most cases political implications for they change the current 
power structure and can encounter explicit or hidden resistance from these 
political forces who fear the loss of their power through decentralisation” 
(SDC 2001, p 4). The need for decentralisation, however, is not questioned. 
Usually, failures are not seen as a consequence of the whole concept and its 
underpinnings as such, but rather as implementation difficulties: “[Earlier] 
decentralisation failed mainly because it did not decentralise enough. It was 
not sufficiently participatory and it lacked accountability towards local civil 
society” (SDC 2007b, p 3; see also Ribot 2002, p 7). 
A broader reading of decentralisation as a domain of good governance fur-
ther highlights the preconditions under which good governance really has 
a chance to function. In this regard, Grindle (2007) showed that although 
good governance seems to be a fairly concrete issue, in reality it refers to 
changing virtually all aspects of the public sector and that “the adoption of 
the good governance paradigm implies a very wide range of institutional 
preconditions for economic and political development and for poverty to be 
significantly reduced” (Grindle 2007, p 553).
Following this review of mainstream discussions related to the opportuni-
ties and potential pitfalls of decentralisation, we now move on to the insights 
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gained through the eight case studies presented in this edited volume. These 
studies are briefly summarised below in order to launch a discussion as to 
how far they confirm (or reject) some of the points regarding opportunities 
and risks detailed above, and how far they direct our attention to new issues 
and questions that need to be taken into account.
1.3  Eight case studies
In this section, the eight case studies (Figure 1) are summarised, while their 
findings are presented in detail in the following chapters of this volume. We 
start with Latin America.
Cherryl André de la Porte, Luis Manuel Martínez R. and Peter R.W. 
Gerritsen ask whether decentralisation helped to secure more sustainable 
management of drinking water in an urban area of a municipality in  Mexico. 
Through broad decentralisation regulations adopted in 1983, Mexican 
municipalities were entrusted with looking after drinking water and sani-
tation, while the respective funding remained under the control of higher 
administrative levels. Municipalities collected water users’ fees, but these 
had to be sent to the state level, then returning to the municipalities’ general 
coffer rather than the water sector from where they stemmed. Besides, deci-Fig. 1 Locations of the 
eight case studies.
Buenos Aires, Argentina
Tsimane' Territories, Bolivia
North-East India
Eastern Terai, NepalNorth-West Frontier
Province, Pakistan
Kerala, India
Bolivian Municipalities
El Grullo, Mexico
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sion-making regarding water services was part of the municipalities’ gen-
eral local governance procedures, and was usually controlled by the political 
party in power. In the authors’ case study locality (the municipality of El 
Grullo), however, things developed differently. Here, the municipality was 
able (after such demands had been voiced by concerned citizens’ circles) 
to create a separate body to take care of drinking water and sanitation, the 
Water and Sanitation Board, which is entitled to directly use the collected 
fees without sending them to the general coffer. This Board initiated a hori-
zontal institutional network encompassing adjacent municipalities, in order 
to coordinate water-related works. However, as fees are low, the Board’s 
financial viability is threatened, resulting in poor operation and maintenance 
of the infrastructure. The researchers argue that a broader involvement of the 
water users and other important stakeholders would help the Board to devise 
a more sustainable financing strategy, but that this is not done partly because 
of populist measures taken by politicians at higher levels. The authors, 
though, see signs of the basis of decision-making processes being broadened 
in the related subject area of watershed management, so crucial for securing 
water supplies. Here, non-state actors, in this case primarily a local univer-
sity, started to act as mediators to bring together a range of stakeholders that 
should have a say in watershed-related policy processes (including El Grul-
lo’s Water and Sanitation Board). Though tangible outcomes are yet to be 
produced, the process of stakeholder involvement attracted wide attention 
throughout Mexico and even received a special national award. Interest-
ingly, though local governance bodies are still reluctant to engage in broadly 
based and more participatory decision-making – as the case study illustrates 
– such decision-making is supported by recent legislation passed by the cen-
tral state. The 2004 Law on National Waters explicitly mentions the need 
for social participation, thus leading to an (unintended) alliance between 
central state and (local) civil society. In conclusion, the capacity of both the 
municipality and civil society to develop new institutions is attributed by the 
researchers to “local political will, largely supported by citizens”. 
Cecilia Cross and Ada Freytes Frey zoom further into the everyday prac-
tice of “decentralisation in the making” (Cross and Freytes Frey 2009). In 
Argentina’s capital city of Buenos Aires, waste management is the task of 
a public enterprise called CEAMSE (Coordinación Ecológica Área Metro-
politana Sociedad del Estado), which was created in 1977 as a centralised 
authority by the then military regime. CEAMSE was to replace the large 
informal economy of waste collection and treatment which provided a 
large number of poor families with a subsistence livelihood. However, sup-
Decentralisation Meets Local Complexity
26
North-South
perspectives
ported by local and foreign non-governmental organisations (NGOs), these 
 cartoneras (people collecting waste from streets) and quemeros (people 
collecting waste and burning it in special plants) resisted, and even grew in 
number, often leading to conflicts with the authorities. In recent years, the 
wave of the decentralisation discourse has reached Argentina as well. In late 
2004, the provincial government of Buenos Aires announced a new policy 
called Sin Desperdicio (‘without wasting’) with the aim of decentralising 
the waste economy. A cornerstone of the programme was the establishment 
of plants where waste could be treated, classified and prepared for further 
recycling and marketing. These plants were to be run by social organisations 
themselves (they were therefore called ‘social plants’), technically super-
vised and advised by CEAMSE. Cross and Freytes Frey had the opportunity 
to accompany the planning process for one such plant as this new policy was 
being put into practice. Through this action research, they gained in-depth 
knowledge on the actors involved, their specific interests, the logic that struc-
tured their approaches towards, and activities within, the planning process.
In their dense description, the authors illustrate first of all the variety of 
actors involved, ranging from the provincial government to the municipali-
ties, CEAMSE, a whole array of NGOs and social movements, as well as 
‘actors in the making’, i.e. groups that are gradually being shaped as they are 
involved in the ongoing negotiations (Cross and Freytes Frey 2009). Each 
of these social entities has rather different expectations regarding the out-
come of the negotiations. For example, the provincial government hopes to 
resolve the conflicts between the authorities and the (informal) cartoneras 
and quemeros, while some politicians within this government try to gain 
political benefit (for example by scheduling important decisions to coincide 
with electoral processes). The ‘social movements’, on the other hand, are 
characterised by a low degree of formalisation, which hinders their capaci-
ties for participation in the negotiation processes. In addition, some of the 
leaders feel under pressure to produce positive outcomes in order to improve 
their legitimacy vis-à-vis their ‘clientele’. In addition, “poor people join 
social movements in order to satisfy their basic needs” (Cross and Freytes 
Frey 2009). In conclusion, Cross and Freytes Frey argue that “incorporating 
new actors implies the multiplication of logics and interaction levels”. This 
means that outcomes are not only influenced by the multitude of stakes in 
play, but also by these interaction levels and often by specific procedures 
as well. In their case study, negotiation is characterised by multitudes, non-
coordination and ad-hocism – a reality in which less organised groups are 
‘caught in crossfire’ as they are not equipped with the necessary bargaining 
skills, and often lacking the time to handle new situations.
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Others, though, are skilled indeed to take the opportunities offered by decen-
tralisation. Fernando Antezana and Manuel de la Fuente take us to such 
a context in Bolivia. They highlight the fact that decentralisation offers 
opportunities and thus resembles a resource to be accessed. The authors 
describe, on the one hand, the measures taken by the state to allow for great-
er decentralisation and analyse, on the other hand, ‘local complexities’ – 
complexities that encouraged some groups to access decentralised bodies 
as an important strategic means. As regards greater decentralisation: For a 
very long time, the state of Bolivia has been controlled by elites consisting 
of whites and mestizos (descendants of the colonial settlers) who kept the 
indigenous population (being the majority) at bay. As social unrest increased 
in the 1990s, the government introduced the Popular Participation Law in 
1994, including precise stipulations for new mechanisms of citizen–state 
interaction and thereby differing from legislation in other Latin American 
countries. This law allows for the direct election of municipal authorities, 
allocates around 20% of the state budget to these authorities for develop-
mental purposes, and permits the collection of municipalities’ own taxes. 
As a consequence, the municipalities now not only included the urban cen-
tres, but were extended to include the rural hinterlands as well. Finally, local 
groups got the opportunity to register as ‘grassroots territorial organisations’, 
thus gaining access to developmental schemes (they can propose and imple-
ment such schemes); but even more important was the fact that local people 
were given the responsibility to organise – according to their own customs 
 – so-called ‘Municipal Oversight Committees’, which have to check and 
formally approve the development plans submitted by the elected municipal 
authorities. The 1999 Law of Municipalities strengthened these groups by 
making participatory planning compulsory. The authors argue that the gov-
ernment in power expected this law to pacify the growing civil unrest while 
hoping to broaden the ruling party’s influence at the grassroots level. 
However, things turned out very differently. To illustrate this process, 
Antezana and de la Fuente recall Bolivian history as being characterised 
by ‘racism’ – the minority of whites and mestizos dominated the majority, 
which was formed by a very heterogeneous array of indigenous groupings. 
Domination was exercised not only politically but also economically, with 
influential families taking over communal lands or private-sector enter-
prises being favoured to extract natural resources. Indigenous awareness, 
though, started to grow as a result of various factors (e.g. legislation for land 
reforms, a growing number of NGOs, etc.), leading to the creation of a range 
of local movements (see also Bottazzi 2009). In addition, international dis-
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courses came to favour not only decentralisation, but the rights of ‘indig-
enous people’ as well. In the first municipal elections in 1995 (following the 
introduction of the Popular Participation Law in 1994), indigenous groups 
did not gain much influence. This, however, changed when they won several 
municipalities in the 1999 elections and emerged as the major political force 
in the municipal elections of 2004, which paved the way for their leader Evo 
Morales to become Bolivia’s first indigenous president in 2005. 
How was this possible? On the basis of an analysis of ten municipalities in 
rural areas of the Bolivian highlands, Antezana and de la Fuente propose two 
key explanations: (i) the capacity of indigenous groups to strengthen their 
organisations and put them on a broad basis, and (ii) their strategic use of the 
1994 Law of Municipalities. The authors argue that, in contrast to traditional 
political parties, which are controlled by a few influential leaders, opinion-
building, internal organisation and control of indigenous groups are more 
democratic in that they are being influenced by traditional patterns of social 
interaction that is based on deliberation until consensus is achieved. Accord-
ingly, the groups are able to mobilise a huge following that not only goes to 
vote, but is also willing to take extra-legal measures to press for demands 
(such as road blocking, etc.). Perceiving the 1994 law as an opportunity, 
indigenous groups strategically direct their participation in municipal elec-
tions to take local or regional power constellations into account. While they 
enter into alliances with some other groups in some places, they do not do 
so in others. And above all, they started to nominate their own candidates, 
giving further confidence to the indigenous population. Though indigenous 
groups have gained enormous political influence in a rather short period of 
time, the authors are still sceptical regarding developmental outcomes. They 
point out that the effectiveness of municipalities in delivering results has 
not increased, but that conflicts concerning the allocation of public funds 
are emerging among the heterogeneous indigenous groups – questions that 
would justify further detailed analysis. 
In conclusion, Antezana and de la Fuente argue that although the main goal 
of the 1994 laws regarding municipalities and popular participation had 
been to integrate the traditional autonomous forms of organisation into 
the public administration and thereby to put it under stronger state control, 
things eventually seemed to turn out in the opposite way: Instead of the gap 
between neo-liberal state and indigenous organisations being closed, the lat-
ter – strengthened by strategically integrating the local governments as a 
new powerful and even ‘official’ platform for fostering resistance against 
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policies imposed by the central state – democratically took over power at 
the central and, in part, regional levels. In this way, decentralisation uninten-
tionally made a significant contribution to bringing to power the social and 
popular movements which now are engaged in radically re-shaping the rela-
tionships between state, citizen and indigenous community, clearly going 
beyond classical state–citizen dichotomies. As a matter of fact, the recent 
events in Bolivia seem to prove that the authors are right. 
Patrick Bottazzi digs even deeper into the Bolivian experience, highlight-
ing not only local complexities, but also the heterogeneous nature of the 
state decentralisation efforts. Examining the Amazon lowlands of Bolivia, 
he details the relationships between (at least) three initiatives for increas-
ing the scope for local participation: (i) the granting of considerable rights 
to indigenous forms of governance, (ii) efforts to bring about participatory 
approaches in nature protection, and (iii) the system of municipalities (as 
analysed by Antezana and de la Fuente; see above). Increasing awareness 
of the rights of indigenous people and support by various forms of foreign 
organisations (church missionaries, NGOs, etc.) led to the emergence of for-
malised indigenous groups (here of the Tsimane ’). Taking up issues such as 
access to land or the presence of timber companies, they started calling and 
agitating for more and substantial control over their territories. Based on a 
complex interwoven process of events including similar demands in other 
localities, the Bolivian state agreed to the creation of the status of Tierra 
Comunitaria de Origen (Communal Land of Origin). This status was grant-
ed to the Tsimane ’ in 1990. In a separate development within environmental 
discourses, the protection of forests, too, gave rise to more local control. 
With reference to international developments, large extents of forests were 
declared as ‘Man and Biosphere Reserves’ (MAB) under this global scheme 
of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation 
(UNESCO), including forests that were inhabited by Tsimane ’ as well as 
many other indigenous groups. However, in spite of the area having been 
declared protected, settlers from the Andes arrived, leading to uneasiness 
and resistance from the local people. To mitigate tensions, the state invent-
ed the category of ‘National Park and Indigenous Territory’. However, the 
task of managing the MAB was given to an international NGO. As tensions 
emerged between settlers and indigenous people on one side, and interna-
tional agencies on the other, the state provided local organisations with fur-
ther powers. These bodies and functions, though, were poorly coordinated 
with the political forms of control of the Tierra Comunitaria de Origen. 
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To complicate things further, the formal process of state decentralisation 
through municipalities enters the scene. As already explained by Antezana 
and de la Fuente (cf. above), municipalities were now to include their hinter-
land, and thus all the rural terrain, as well. Again, new forms of governance 
organisations were introduced, thereby reproducing – at least initially – the 
traditional power structures. Interestingly, municipalities obtained control 
over the category of ‘public forests’, and were requested to establish partici-
patory management committees – separate from other institutional arrange-
ments that were introduced in largely the same geographical space. All this 
led to “the establishment of different management mechanisms (...) parallel 
to political decentralisation” (Bottazzi 2009). 
In his article, Bottazzi details all the organisations at the local, regional, 
national and international levels that were in one way or another involved 
in these processes of “proliferation of political decision-making”, leading to 
“institutional inflation” through a process he calls ‘institutional segregation’ 
(Bottazzi 2009). However, this institutional inflation was not able to over-
come the power asymmetries inherently present in the ‘institutional segrega-
tion’, thus leading to complex problems of legitimacy (e.g.  which arrange-
ments should be adopted, which ones should be privileged, etc.). Although 
indigenous institutions were created and recognised, underlying differences 
regarding skills or resources available prevented municipal structures from 
solving the problems of native indigenous people being excluded; as an 
unintended consequence, practices and spaces for illegal utilisation of for-
ests multiplied.
The article ends with a discussion of the tension between the legitimate call 
of indigenous groups for more self-control and the implicit risk of ‘prolifera-
tion of decision-making’, which leads to competition among social groups 
over resources. Thus, Bottazzi argues for more coherence in political organi-
sation, favouring the municipal system – as it is linked to the formal norms 
of the overarching state, and is not linked, in principle, to the risks of ‘ethnic 
segmentation’ (we will see a similar argument emerging in the Kerala study 
below). 
With the study by Bishnu Raj Upreti, we remain with nature protection, but 
now move to South Asia. He analyses the discourse and practice of partici-
patory nature conservation in Nepal, by closely analysing the Koshi Tappu 
Wildlife Reserve (KTWR) in the country’s Eastern Terai. Upreti shows that 
present difficulties in implementing participatory nature conservation can 
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not be understood without paying close attention to historical developments. 
He recalls the 1972 National Park and Wildlife Conservation Act, which was 
based on Western models of that time emphasising strict nature protection. 
The Koshi Tappu reserve was established in 1976, leading to the shifting 
(actually the displacement) of indigenous groups from the newly declared 
park area. These groups came under additional pressure due to the in-migra-
tion of many families from Nepal’s hill region under a state-sponsored 
internal colonisation scheme. Competition arose specifically with regard to 
access to land and water, and the indigenous population’s attempts to reclaim 
lost grounds within the park were severely punished by the authorities. In 
essence, Upreti describes this situation (referring to the analytical concept 
of legal pluralism) as a conflict between customary rights of resource access 
and newly introduced state regulations.
It was only with the introduction of parliamentary democracy in 1990 and 
the strengthening of local governments (in Nepal called Village Develop-
ment Committees, VDCs) that participatory discourses started to influence 
thinking about nature protection as well. One expression of this shift in atti-
tude was the introduction, around 1994, of legislation to permit the creation 
of buffer zones around parks that were to be managed through participa-
tory procedures. From the perspective of state officials, this new approach 
was to highlight the need for alternative livelihood options for indigenous 
groups, thus reducing their dependence on the park area. For this purpose, 
people were organised into community or user groups. The indigenous peo-
ple’s expectations regarding the programme, however, were to reassert at 
least to some extent their customary rights for grazing, fishing, collection 
of grasses, or even using parts of the park for cultural rites such as funerals. 
As a matter of fact, conflicts continued especially concerning these resource 
uses, and Upreti cites a number of incidents where park authorities drastical-
ly refused people’s (illegal) practising of claims (e.g. killing buffaloes that 
grazed inside the park). Such incidents led to a worsening of state–people 
relations, and many indigenous people (who gradually started organising 
themselves as a result of the spreading discourse of indigenousness) came to 
look towards the Maoist insurgence for a vision of a better future. 
In conclusion, Upreti proposes that the move towards more participatory and 
decentralised procedures in nature conservation is a highly welcome one. 
However, its implementation did not take up the core concerns of indige-
nous groups that suffered most from the establishment of the park. Although 
the formation of community groups under the buffer zone programme is an 
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important step, “such initiatives shift or dilute the fundamental causes of 
tension by diverting people’s concerns (e.g. organising groups for kitchen 
gardening instead of mobilising them to assert their indigenous and custom-
ary rights)” (Upreti 2009). 
Similar discrepancies are observed by Babar Shahbaz and Tanvir Ali in 
their analysis of decentralisation in Pakistan’s forestry sector, e.g. the dis-
crepancy between official declarations at the policy level and the experience 
of actual ‘decentralised’ forest management on the ground. To start with, 
Shahbaz and Ali share the policy-makers’ realisation that “decentralisation 
is unavoidable” (Shahbaz and Ali 2009). Until recently, forest management 
by the state was still characterised by colonial rules, regulations and top-
down attitudes. As a matter of fact, the country’s forest laws had changed 
little since they were first written by the colonial powers. As to the forests in 
the North-West Frontier Province (it is here where a major part of Pakistan’s 
forestland is located), the state has proprietary rights to most of them that 
severely limit local use rights as the state’s focus is on forest protection and 
the punishment of ‘misuse’. The very high deforestation rate is evidence 
enough to show that the colonial, top-down attitude of the Forest Depart-
ment has completely failed, and that indeed “decentralisation is unavoid-
able”. The question, then, is how decentralisation is approached. Shahbaz 
and Ali show that initially, some experiments with participation were under-
taken in the context of donor-supported rural development programmes. 
However, it was with the massive Forest Sector Project (FSP) launched in 
1996 that these isolated measures were to be formalised and mainstreamed 
through a complete reorganisation of the Forest Department. The driving 
force behind the FSP was the Asian Development Bank (ADB), calling for 
reforms through (i) changes in the legal framework (i.e. to promulgate new, 
participation-oriented policy, laws and related regulations), (ii) the reorgan-
isation of the Forest Department and (iii) the introduction of the Joint Forest 
Management approach as a tool to interlink the demands of local people 
and the state with regard to forests. Subsequently, Joint Forest Management 
Committees (JFMCs) were introduced in pilot areas, to be expanded to the 
whole province later on. In their study, Shahbaz and Ali carefully analyse the 
ground reality of creating and operating JFMCs. JFMCs – sometimes called 
Village Development Committees (VDCs) – were intended both to address 
local  people’s livelihood concerns and to introduce more sustainable forest 
use practices. The democra tically elected VDCs were thus to prepare Village 
Development Plans, proposing appro priate measures to improve economic 
conditions and forest use. In reality, though, hardly any concrete development 
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measures materialised. Moreover, Women’s Organisations (intended to rep-
resent the interests of women, who, under the prevailing social norms, are not 
allowed to join male VDCs) may indeed exist, but they exist on paper only. 
Searching for explanations, the authors propose several interlinked core 
issues. The first has to do with the basic reading and interpretation of the FSP. 
While those villagers who took part in the programme emphasised its devel-
opmental component – this being of central importance for them – the Forest 
Department staff accorded priority to forest protection. Second, VDCs did 
not represent economically weaker sections but were controlled by the more 
influential local elite – Shahbaz and Ali remind us of the very heterogeneous 
and socially stratified nature of Pakistani villages. Third, the analysis showed 
that it is not the villagers that are responsible for the high deforestation rate, 
but a network of timber traders, some forest officials and local leaders – the 
‘Timber Mafia’ – that benefits from the very high prices paid for timber in 
Pakistan. Many local people suspect the forest officials of being linked to 
the ‘Timber Mafia’, while now having to advocate JFM. Thus, Shahbaz and 
Ali identify the lack of trust as a core issue blocking participatory forest 
management. This is further aggravated by the fact that the state’s forest 
laws – including the new ones emerging from the FSP – do not consider at all 
customary rules and procedures governing access to forests. In the light of 
the deep mistrust between forest officials and local forest users, and because 
they are backed up by a strong local tribal decision-making process (jirga), 
customary laws continue to structure local practices, though declared illegal 
by the state. In conclusion, the authors reiterate that decentralisation is an 
interesting avenue, but that the rather mechanical application of the global 
concept of JFM will not work without considering local complexities: “The 
difficulty is that one has to deal with both formal legal instruments and infor-
mal rules (customary practices, etc.), where unequal power relations and 
social conflicts are quite common” (Shahbaz and Ali 2009). 
Within South Asia, we move from the North-West frontier to the North-East 
frontier: to the district of Karbi Anglong in the state of Assam, India. Sanjay 
Barbora asks the challenging question why demands for greater autonomy 
continue to be raised in a context where a considerable degree of decentrali-
sation has already been implemented. The North-East of India is populated 
by a huge spectrum of ethnic groups, and Barbora recalls that already in the 
first years after independence in 1947, the Indian state introduced specific 
institutional provisions for indigenous ethnic groups, by creating ‘Autono-
mous Councils’ with a considerable degree of judicial, legislative and execu-
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tive powers. This includes control over parts of forests, and thus crucial land 
resources. Under these provisions, Karbi Anglong became an Autonomous 
District Council in 1951. In 1986, though, a non-violent movement emerged 
that demanded further control and the creation of an autonomous Karbi state. 
This movement split in the early 1990s. One section favoured a non-violent 
struggle for a non-ethnic, broadly based concept of self-governance. The 
other section, however, took up arms and organised around strictly ethnic 
claims in order to “struggle to occupy the traditional lands of the Karbi and 
restore rule by traditional indigenous leaders” (Barbora 2009). Key targets of 
their armed attacks were settlers that migrated to the area from other regions 
of India and, increasingly, other local ethnic groups or tribes – all of them 
considered as encroachers upon the Karbi ‘homeland’. This led to the forma-
tion of competing tribal militias as well as interventions by the Indian army 
that have brought about widespread bloodshed, destruction of property, as 
well as more anger and new violence. 
In his attempt to understand this tragedy, Sanjay Barbora focuses on the 
importance of land and of control over land. His analysis shows at least 
three layers of often competing regimes of granting access to forests (and 
thus land) by granting settlement permits. The Executive Committee of the 
Autonomous District Council gives preference to scheduled tribes8 from 
the area, as well as from adjacent regions. However, Barbora observes that 
political favouritism is widespread. In the more hilly regions, traditional 
Village Chiefs continue to play a crucial role in allocating land for settle-
ment. They favour land distribution to their ethnic (sub)groups to the det-
riment of ‘others’: other tribes, immigrant settlers, etc. Even at this level, 
Barbora observes favouritism in providing tenure rights. Last but not least, 
the Indian state continues to exercise considerable control over the (decen-
tralised) Autonomous District Councils: “These provisions [of autonomy] 
bestow enormous legal powers on the council, but it does not necessarily 
mean that the council is able to exercise all these powers” (Barbora 2009). 
The Governor of the state of Assam has considerable control over the Coun-
cil, and the executive affairs of the Council are implemented by regular state 
bureaucrats. In summary, we find a highly contested social arena in which 
access to land seems central, with this access being contested on the basis of 
ideologies of ethnicity, homelands and inherited rights. 
But Sanjay Barbora goes a step further in his reading of the highly conflic-
tive and militarised reality of India’s North-East. He suggests that the inabil-
ity of the modern Indian nation-state to secure people’s access to land and to 
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prevent the escalation of violence and suffering has led to an outright disen-
chantment with the idea of citizenship: people do not perceive themselves 
as being equal members (citizens) in accordance with the idea of the demo-
cratic nation-state. As a consequence – so Barbora’s argument goes – they 
perceive the provision of the Autonomous Council as political or ‘constitu-
tional engineering’ to grasp control over natural resources and specifically 
land. As a response, societal orientation and ties are looked for in the ethnic, 
communal sphere – what Barbora calls “peoplehood”. 
Competing notions of local representation held by state and non-state 
groups are also the subject of the study by R. Ramakumar and K.N. Nair. 
They address decentralisation as experienced in the Indian state of Kera-
la. Though they have existed in different shapes for a long time, local bod-
ies have never had real decision-making powers and adequate resources to 
stimulate decentralised development processes. It was only when a left-
wing coalition government came into power in 1996 that such provisions 
were granted. On the one hand, local bodies (panchayats) were to be elected, 
and they were to be allocated 35–40% of the state’s developmental budget, 
the major part of it untied, meaning that local bodies were allowed to decide 
on their own developmental priorities. In order to equip the panchayats with 
skills and capacities for local-level development planning, a huge People’s 
Plan Campaign was launched. Ramakumar and Nair specifically address 
the relationship between these elected local bodies (being part and parcel of 
the modern state system of Kerala) and non-state groups that are involved in 
local development. As a matter of fact, Kerala has long been home to a large 
number of non-governmental organisations and social reform movements, 
many of which played a crucial role in the social and economic history of the 
state.
Based on case studies in the hilly regions of Kerala, the authors look at the 
effectiveness of interventions for the provision of drinking water and relat-
ed to watersheds. Prior to the People’s Plan Campaign, such interventions 
were an important field of NGO activities. Most NGOs in Kerala were estab-
lished in response to religious or caste concerns, and continue to have strong 
affiliations with the respective social groups. In the case study locality of 
Upputhara, prominent NGOs are related to the Catholic church as well as 
to specific castes. Prior to decentralisation, they played an important role 
in carrying out drinking water schemes or even implementing programmes 
of the Indian central government and the state of Kerala at the village level. 
Decentralisation caused the implementation of such schemes to shift to the 
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elected local bodies. Based on their empirical evidence, Ramakumar and 
Nair argue that scheme implementation has become more transparent. As a 
matter of fact, decentralisation “‘disturbed’ the social environment in which 
religious and caste organisations functioned” (Ramakumar and Nair 2009). 
While scheme beneficiaries were previously selected by a small group of 
NGO-related persons, and while benefits were accessible to more or less the 
NGO’s constituency, selection processes became more broadly based, thus 
more democratic, and benefits became accessible to a wider range of people. 
Thus the central argument of this study is: “Democratic planning and gov-
ernance in large societies marked by social and cultural diversity is too com-
plex and big a task to be left only to social movements or non-governmental 
groups. In fact, increased democratisation demands a constructive role from 
civil society actors in bringing people closer to democratically elected bod-
ies” (Ramakumar and Nair 2009). In this reading, decentralisation is not 
perceived as a tool of “constitutional engineering” (see Barbora 2009), but 
as a struggle to make the state responsible and accountable – thus to ‘deepen 
democracy’ (Ramakumar and Nair 2009). 
To further substantiate this argument in favour of the central role of a dem-
ocratically controlled state, the authors refer to another example of caste-
based social movements. Within the caste system that dominated Kerala 
society till the early 20th century, the untouchable Ezhava caste was at the 
very margin, having restricted access to public spaces or even Hindu tem-
ples. A social movement emerged (and was gradually formalised to become 
an important non-state actor) from within this caste that struggled for Ezha-
va rights, achieving considerable success in the course of time. However, 
as certain sections of Ezhavas started to benefit from increased economic 
opportunities, the caste-based organisation turned into an institution of this 
new elite, subsequently concentrating on the particular interests of this elite 
and sidelining or even working against the interests of the majority of Ezha-
vas that remain poor. Ramakumar and Nair argue with Harriss (2001) that 
development can take place only within the arena of “contestational politics 
and of the conflicts of ideas and interests that are an essential part of democ-
racy”, and that decentralisation can be a core instrument in this.
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1.4   Contextualising case study insights within 
 critical debates 
The eight vivid descriptions above indeed show efforts at expanding the 
basis of decision-making by involving specific sets of stakeholders, in con-
nection with specific topics and to achieve related social goals as well as 
elements of (sustainable) management of nature. All examples are inspired 
by the recent global interest in ‘decentralisation’, translated into respective 
regional, socio-political and ecological contexts. 
The case studies also touch upon some of the points raised in mainstream 
debates on decentralisation (as summarised in Ribot’s nine points). They 
highlight, among others, the importance of fiscal decentralisation and the 
differences in implementation. They show the modalities in sharing respon-
sibilities between the state and ‘citizens’ with regard to selected topics, and 
the processes of negotiating these arrangements. Beyond this, they bring to 
our attention many challenges that are being faced in the various case study 
localities. Some of these challenges, too, relate to mainstream debates, such 
as elite capture of weak local capacities.
However, many of the details given in the case studies go beyond what we 
described in section 1.2. Central among an array of new insights is the ten-
sion between ‘the state’ and ‘the local’, as well as, related to this, the hetero-
geneity and complexity of ‘the local’. As a matter of fact, we have so far used 
notions such as state, citizens, governance, participation and nature in a 
rather general way, understood as pre-given and ‘quasi-objective’ categories 
through which both development discourse and practice are elaborated and 
organised. To recall the initial quote by Gaventa (2002), this refers mainly 
to “new mechanisms to promote more direct citizen engagement in the proc-
esses of governance, ranging from the creation of new decentralised insti-
tutions, to a wide variety of participatory and consultative processes (...).” 
Thus, mainstream debates on decentralisation, including critical thoughts 
about implementation difficulties, centre on the further refinement of mech-
anisms to improve citizens’ engagement, and governance processes, and on 
further strengthening decentralised institutions. Many recent documents by 
government agencies or donors treat the subject in this rather managerial 
and technocratic language based on categories that are taken for granted.
The case studies, however, highlight the ‘non-mechanistic’ side of decentral-
isation: struggles over competences between state and local groups, among 
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citizens, and over the meaning of participation. Can we learn more from this 
everyday reality of decentralisation and the intended as well as unintended 
consequences of related interventions, when we pause for a moment and 
reflect on the language of decentralisation – and thus the assumed ‘realities’ 
– so much taken for granted? 
For this reflection, though, we need to equip ourselves first with adequate 
analytical and theoretical concepts that go beyond the mainstream,  in order 
to deal with themes that critically question mainstream underpinnings of 
the decentralisation discourse. In a first step, therefore, we show that the 
mainstream perception of decentralisation is embedded in a structural-
functionalist conceptualisation of society. In a second step, we then discuss 
four theoretical propositions that go beyond this functionalist ontology, i.e. 
(i) resistance, (ii) simplifying state techniques, (iii) state-in-society and, 
related to this, (iv) society–nature relationships. Having equipped ourselves 
with conceptual notions and thoughts from these recent theoretical debates, 
we will then re-visit the case studies’ insights into the interface between 
decentralisation and local complexities. 
1.4.1   Structural-functional assumptions of state–citizen 
 relations
We first concentrate on the very core of the decentralisation argument that 
concerns the state and its relations to citizens, or society in general. After all, 
decentralisation can not be thought of as independent of the state: It refers to 
a change of the relationship between a (central) state and its related groups 
making up ‘society’ – the central state should delegate more powers to the 
local level and thus to citizens; local-level authorities then have the function 
of advancing citizens’ concerns. In this core notion, the state is perceived of 
as having clear functions towards society, such as safeguarding the territory 
of the nation, providing security to its citizens, ensuring welfare, providing 
development, etc. The state is understood as a system that looks after soci-
ety. Its core is formed by the executive, i.e. state agencies, departments and 
the officials staffing them. Society at large is providing the guidelines and 
mandate to the state through the legislature, and an independent judiciary 
ensures the legality of actions taken by state representatives. As a matter of 
fact, the present emphasis on good governance is exactly meant to increase 
the efficiency and effectiveness of these structures of the state system that 
are perceived as not yet in a position to properly fulfil their functions. The 
present state in the South needs to be further ‘developed’ – developed 
towards the ideal of the modern, liberal-democratic nation-state. 
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We call this a model based on a functionalist ontology. The model of the 
modern, democratic nation-state is ‘a given fact’ in mainstream debates. 
Good governance initiatives all over the globe take this model as their nor-
mative orientation and thus as a global universal. This universalising of the 
modern state requires our close attention, as decentralisation is part and par-
cel of this globalised discourse. 
Central to this model is the conceptual separation of the state administration 
(the executive) from society at large. The state’s organisations and staff are 
expected to ‘function’ as neutral officials in the service of society, i.e. the 
people (see the notion of ‘public servants’). They are expected to “behave 
impersonally”, not affected by their social background such as family or eth-
nic relations (Corbridge 2008, p 107). This characterisation of the modern 
state as an agency that looks after its people, and for this purpose is detached 
from society, has been described in the early 20th century by the German 
sociologist Max Weber as the modern state bureaucracy (Weber 2006). In 
order to fulfil its functions vis-à-vis society within a national territory, the 
state administration has developed – according to Weber – from a feudal 
structure of patron–client relations and personal favouritism to an independ-
ent, neutral bureaucratic machinery: “The fully developed bureaucratic 
apparatus compared with other organisations exactly as does the machine 
with the non-mechanical modes of production. Precision, speed, unambigu-
ity, knowledge of the files, continuity, discretion, unity, strict subordination, 
reduction of friction and of material and personal costs – these are raised to 
the optimum point by the strictly bureaucratic administration (...)” (Weber 
2006, p 57).
The rationale behind this bureaucracy is the maxim to treat all members of 
the modern nation-state on equal terms: “The more complicated and spe-
cialised modern culture becomes, the more its external supporting appa-
ratus demands the personally detached and strictly objective expert (...)” 
(Weber 2006, p 58, emphasis ours). This expert, or government official, is 
the cornerstone of the bureaucracy: “(...) office holding is not considered 
ownership of a source of income, to be exploited for rents or emoluments in 
exchange for the rendering of certain services, as was normally the case dur-
ing the Middle Ages (...). Rather, entrance into an office (...) is considered an 
acceptance of a specific duty of fealty to the purpose of the office in return 
for the grant of a secure existence. (...) It is decisive for the modern loyalty to 
an office that, in the pure type, it does not establish a relationship to a person 
(...), but rather is devoted to impersonal and functional purposes” (Weber 
2006, p 50, emphasis in original). 
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The state that represents a detached agency entrusted with core functions 
towards society – these underpinnings of the Weberian (ideal-type) descrip-
tion of the modern nation-state have emerged from an analysis of European 
history but we can find them without much change in the postcolonial South 
as well. Due to colonialism and later the discourse of Modernisation Theory 
(which is actually rooted, among others, in Weber’s contrasting of tradition 
and modernity; see also Parsons’ pattern variables), the new states were to 
be moulded exactly in line with this model – to become the famous develop-
mental states. To recall Weber: “Other factors operating in the direction of 
bureaucratisation are the manifold tasks of social welfare policies which are 
either saddled upon the modern state by interest groups or which the state 
usurps for reasons of power or for ideological motives” (Weber 2006, p 56). 
Good governance neatly interlinks with the notion of the developmental 
state based on the Weberian ideal-type. The (postcolonial, or Southern) state 
is perceived as not yet in a position to fulfil its duties vis-à-vis its citizens 
as expected. Therefore, further improvements in the functioning of gov-
ernment administration are required. Such technical procedures within the 
bureaucracy in need of adjustments include several of the points characteris-
ing good governance (see section 1.2), e.g. democratisation, accountability 
of public servants, professio na lism, non-discrimination or efficiency. Many 
of these points can be read as making the bureaucracy work better. This is to 
be achieved by administrative-managerial adjustments, or “constitutional 
engineering” (Barbora 2009). 
These are some aspects that underpin the notion of the state and its relations 
to society, aspects that should suffice to indicate that the notion of the modern 
state is not an objectively given universal reality, but is a constructed image, 
a model developed based on a certain reading of history, and thus having a 
history and a certain meaning. The core notion of decentralisation is embed-
ded within this constructed meaning as well. As a matter of fact, it is exactly 
the questioning of these (ideological) underpinnings that can provide further 
insights and a more comprehensive understanding of the theory and practice 
of decentralisation. To further strengthen our analytical scrutiny required for 
an in-depth reading of the case study insights, we thus introduce four lines of 
discussions that provide alternative conceptualisations of state–society rela-
tions: (i) resistance, (ii) simplifying state techniques, (iii) state-in-society 
and, related to this, (iv) society–nature relationships.
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1.4.2  Resisting hegemonic notions of the state
While a Weberian liberal view presents the state as entrusted with the task to 
ensure the welfare of its citizens, it is especially from the neo-Marxist per-
spective that the state is perceived as an exploiting force – controlled by, and 
an instrument of, the elite, or bourgeoisie, or ‘capitalism’ for that matter. Class 
being the central category of Marxist thought, the state can not be thought 
of independently of class. Mechanisms through which the state (controlled 
by elites) extends control and extracts a surplus can include aiming for an 
income through tariffs and licences, etc. Thus, decentralisation is by default 
suspicious as it continues to be closely linked to the exploitative state. In 
this reading, the interests of the marginalised and oppressed people have to 
be mobilised in order to challenge the bourgeois state’s attempts, for exam-
ple through ‘social movements’. A similar reading emerged in South Asia, 
especially India, in the school of Subaltern Studies (Guha 1982). This school 
perceives the postcolonial, modern nation-state as an alien, external institu-
tion which has been superimposed on traditional Indian society through the 
process of colonialism. The modern Indian state continues to represent these 
colonial principles rooted in Western ideals and framed by notions central 
to Western thought: “Concepts such as citizenship, the state, civil society, 
public sphere, human rights, equality before the law, the individual, distinc-
tions between public and private, the idea of the subject, democracy, popular 
sovereignty, social justice, scientific rationality, and soon all bear the burden 
of European thought and history (...). These concepts entail an unavoidable 
– and in a sense inescapable – universal and secular vision of the human” 
(Chakrabarty 2000, quoted in Spencer 2007, p 68).
Alongside this alien state there has been, since colonial times, the “vernacu-
lar” India (Chatterjee 2001) with its own “politics of people” (Spencer 2007, 
p 43): “This was an autonomous domain, for it neither originated from the 
elite politics nor did its existence depend on the latter. It was traditional only 
in so far as its roots could be traced back to pre-colonial times but it was by 
no means archaic in the sense of being outmoded. Far from being destroyed 
or rendered virtually ineffective, as was elite politics of the traditional type 
by the intrusion of colonialism, it continued to operate vigorously in spite 
of the latter, adjusting itself to the conditions prevailing under the Raj and 
in many respects developing entirely new strains in both form and content” 
(Guha 1982, quoted in Spencer 2007, p 43). And: “(...) the coercive appa-
ratus of the colonial state penetrated Indian society very deeply indeed, but 
the ideological apparatus failed to reach much below the higher levels of the 
Indian elite” (Spencer 2007, p 44).
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Differentiating between alien state (and civil society linked to it) and ver-
nacular local politics has become popular beyond India as a result of Chat-
terjee’s distinction of civil society (the Indian elites that perceive themselves 
as ‘citizens’ of the modern state, and accordingly are part and parcel of the 
Western ideal) and political society (as an expression of associations from 
within the local, vernacular social sphere; Chatterjee 2001). 
Through these conceptualisations of social movements or subaltern political 
society, decentralisation is perceived sceptically, and local people’s struggle 
to have a greater say in decision-making processes therefore focuses on the 
vernacular, which may be referred to as searching for an “autochthonous 
narrative” (Slater 2002, p 257). Owing to the need for resistance through 
political society (a notion more prominent in South Asia) or social move-
ments (a notion more prominent in Latin America), the dichotomy of state 
and society has evolved into a ‘trichotomy’ in which the state, citizens and 
‘indigenous nations or communities’ are defining themselves as belonging 
to a ‘nation’ within the postcolonial nation-state. In this way, they call for a 
‘pluri-national state’ that is supposed to be able to integrate this new – and 
hybrid – concept of actors based on the classical notions of ‘citizen’ and of 
being a ‘member of an ethnic community’ (García-Linera 2007). 
1.4.3  Simplifying state techniques
Decentralisation can also be thought of as a specific set of administrative 
procedures applied by the state in order to govern society. The develop-
mental state, being entrusted with the gigantic task of development, had to 
work through a huge array of technical schemes and interventions in order 
to achieve the structural transformation postulated as the core of modernisa-
tion. Decentralisation, then, might be thought of as in line with such gov-
ernmental schemes and developmental techniques. James Scott (1998) 
analysed a range of development-oriented interventions by modern devel-
opmental states, to propose the idea of state simplification: Though well 
intended, state interventions tended to be schematic. In order to be able to 
implement huge schemes, they were based on assumptions that reduced the 
complexity of reality into simplified categories that were easier to handle by 
the administrative systems of the bureaucracy: “In each case, officials took 
exceptionally complex, illegible, and local social practices, such as land ten-
ure customs (...), and created a standard grid whereby it could be centrally 
recorded and monitored. (...) The social simplifications then introduced not 
only permitted a more finely tuned system of taxation and conscription, 
43
Decentralisation Meets Local Complexity: Introduction
but also greatly enhanced state capacity” (Scott 1998, pp 2f.). Slater (2002, 
p 257) links up with Scott’s argument and argues that the new “technological 
logic of rule” called ‘good governance’ follows a Western-style arrangement 
for democratic rule (Slater 2002, p 257).
Again, Scott reiterates the distance of state and (local) society, and focuses 
on the very different outlook of both entities as to what development should 
achieve. In Scott’s reading, state schemes are “at odds with the way that 
ordinary people wanted and needed to run their lives – on the basis, in part, 
of diversity and the security that comes from not putting all one’s eggs in one 
basket” (Corbridge 2008, p 110). 
Based on Scott’s proposition, decentralisation might indeed be compared 
with other (simplifying) schemes the state started and employed to foster 
development – schemes that also encounter complex social realities. In a 
first reading, this sounds contradictory, as decentralisation is a discourse 
on participation, allowing more voices to be heard, giving space to more 
local development paths. However, in many practices, decentralisation pro-
grammes follow rather blueprint procedures, and are extended bureaucrati-
cally and schematically over the entire territory of a state, leaving no room 
for local adaptation (below we will refer to appropriate case study insights 
from Pakistan or Nepal). 
1.4.4  The everyday ‘state-in-society’
Both non-functionalist positions introduced above – the state as captured by 
capitalist bourgeoisie (or Western-inspired elites), and Scott’s understand-
ing of the developmental state with its simplifying state schemes – continue 
to portray ‘the state’ in a rather monolithic way, separate from society and to 
be resisted.
However, recent studies have started challenging this dichotomy, question-
ing the “accentuation of the dominant and a romanticisation of the resistant” 
(Slater 2002, p 255). A core point in these emerging debates is – to put it 
simply – that the state is made up of people as well, and not of robots (see 
Weber’s notion of the “impersonal and functional”), that people are having 
agency and thus the “ability ‘to make a change’, i.e. to be able ‘to intervene 
in the world, or to refrain from such intervention, with the effect of influenc-
ing a specific process or state of affairs’” (Giddens 1984, p 14).
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In other words: even state officials are humans that are embedded in social 
relations and have to struggle for their everyday livelihood needs, and that 
are thus (besides being members of the state bureaucracy) part and parcel of 
society at large. Thus, the analysis shifts away from a Weberian ideal-type 
understanding of the detached, neutral behaviour of officials, to an analysis 
of the actual doing, living and practising by officials. Such actual practices 
are “often far removed from official mythologies of the state. Few state agen-
cies achieve the separation of the public from the private that Weber called 
for. This might happen to some degree in the ‘commanding heights’ of the 
state, where policies are drawn up, but it is less evident as policies are moved 
down through the ‘agency’s central offices’ to the ‘dispersed field offices’ 
and finally to the ‘trenches’. Particularly in the trenches, men and women 
who are tax collectors, police officers, teachers, and healthcare workers are 
required to balance the pressures placed upon them by supervisors (the prin-
ciples) with those brought to bear by powerful figures in political society” 
(Midgal 2001, quoted in Corbridge 2008, p 113). With this shift in conceptu-
alisation, a very different reading emerges, one that does not position the state 
outside society, but closely interwoven with it, what Midgal calls a “state-in-
society-approach” (Midgal 2001, quoted in Corbridge 2008, p 113). 
New state policies – such as decentralisation – are framed at the higher lev-
els of administration. However, their implementation is effected by a wide 
range of state officials at various levels (central and de-centred) – officials 
that are interwoven with, and exposed to, members of society through com-
plex webs of social relations. The actual everyday practising of decentrali-
sation thus happens in mundane social arenas in which the intentions of 
the higher echelons are translated, interpreted, reshaped and implemented: 
“(...) the ways in which technologies of rule are made flesh will depend on 
the manner in which they are interpreted and put into play by lower-level 
government workers, elected representatives and others. (...) We also need 
to see why and how they are seized upon, understood, reworked and pos-
sibly contested by differently placed people within the population of ‘the 
poor’ (...)” (Corbridge et al 2005, p 7; for Asia see Geiser and Steimann 2004, 
for South America Rist et al 2005). 
Contestation – the notion raised by Corbridge et al. (2005) above – is a 
core category that we need to briefly discuss in order to further sharpen our 
critical understanding of decentralisation as a social practice. In a ‘state-in-
society’ approach, there may still be conflicts between ‘the state’ on the one 
hand, and ‘society’ on the other. However: 
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–  The state is not perceived as a monolithic entity, but as consisting of vari-
ous agencies, groups, hierarchies, factions, people. 
–  Similarly, society is not a consistent system or stratified into classes or 
other forms of homogeneous categories (as notions such as community or 
social movement at times suggest), but comprises multitudes of groups, spe-
cific alliances that may change from issue to issue, and people – all of whom 
may have their different ways of being involved or interwoven with compo-
nents of ‘the state’ – which leads to a social patchwork where the drawing of 
a sharp line between state and society becomes almost impossible. 
All these various entities do have interests and try to advocate their inter-
ests – and thus behave politically. Between the various entities, conflicts 
can emerge, and thus contestations. Contestations, i.e. everyday politics 
becomes an “ensemble of practices, discourses, and institutions that seek 
to establish a certain order and to organise social life in conditions that are 
always potentially subject to conflict (...)” (Slater 2002, p 257; see also Li 
1999). 
Hence, decentralisation may be supported by some state officials while not 
by others; setting up local authorities may be welcomed by certain ‘local 
people’ and not by others. And decentralisation may add another dimension 
of conflict to already ongoing contestations. Decentralisation can thus be 
understood as a social interface which is “(...) a critical point of intersection 
between different life worlds, social fields or levels of social organisation, 
where social discontinuities based upon discrepancies in values, interests, 
knowledges and power are most likely to be located” (Long 2001, p 243).
1.4.5  Individual–society–nature relations
Analytical entry points such as resistance, simplified state schemes or ‘state-
in-society’ focus on the social world. However, when taking into account the 
objects and subjects of resistance, procedural simplifications, or complex 
life worlds, the underlying notions of what a human being is in terms of his 
or her cultural identity or as a citizen, become important as well. And these 
are also part of a complex, contested and historically evolving process that 
includes the natural world. Ontological beliefs of what a human being is, and 
the ways in which that human being integrates into society, are often linked 
to the human being’s relationships with nature and natural resources as well 
(Zimmerer and Basset 2001).
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Considering the underpinnings of decentralisation in such a broader picture 
allows building a bridge to the popular notion of sustainability, which, in 
principle, represents one specific definition of society–nature relations, by 
calling for the needs of present generations to be met without compromising 
the needs of future generations (Commission on Environment and Devel-
opment 1987). In practice, sustainability is often linked to the ecological 
sphere, and this reading is more likely to be promoted and articulated by 
NGOs, researchers or policy-makers than by local farmers or forest resource 
users. However, as the studies in this volume also indicate, this does not 
mean that local resource users are not interested in maintaining the ecologi-
cal basis. As a main difference from the state or NGOs, they practically aim 
to achieve this objective in conjunction with others, i.e. by assuring not only 
the ecological, but also the socio-cultural and political foundations in which 
their life worlds and livelihoods are rooted. Therefore, sustainability-orient-
ed changes in the management of natural resources through decentralisation 
should also be read as very basic alterations in, and challenges to, the routi-
nised, ‘cultural’ relations between individuals, society and nature.
These very basic aspects of the construction of normative understandings 
of individual–society–nature relations form an implicit part of the context 
in which decentralisation takes place. Under certain conditions, they can 
become very important in the arenas in which decentralisation is carved 
out – especially through the manifestation of, and recourse to, the notion 
of  ethnicity (which closely represents individual–society–nature relations). 
‘Ethnicity’ can indeed play an important role in the definition of potentials 
and limitations of the decentralisation process. Here, ethnicity not only 
stands for a socio-demographic category, it also implies the denomination of 
people who have culturally formed notions of what humans are, where they 
come from, how they relate to each other, and how they relate to nature and 
natural resources at their disposal (see Barbora 2009, Bottazzi 2009). The 
recognition of customary rights related to land, resources and institutions – 
which actually express culturally defined human–nature relationships – and 
the related contestations can play a critical role in mobilising local people in 
favour of or against decentralisation (see e.g. Shahbaz and Ali 2009).
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1.5  The complexities of decentralisation 
Pausing for a moment and reflecting on the language – and thus the assumed 
‘realities’ – so much taken for granted in the discourse on decentralisation 
can indeed provide food for thought on the everyday reality and the intended 
as well as unintended consequences of this globalised paradigm. The decon-
struction of taken-for-granted ontological notions helps to take a fresh and 
more comprehensive look at some of the features of decentralisation, how it 
is practised and experienced, and at its consequences. 
To repeat: the insights gained by practitioners of development into the 
opportunities and risks of decentralisation – as summarised in Ribot’s points 
– are crucial, and are also highlighted in some of the case studies presented 
in this volume. Still, understanding most of the ongoing interventions from 
a functionalist perspective of state–society relations does not allow to go 
beyond the surface and to grasp underlying dimensions that indeed often 
impinge on how concrete decentralisation projects operate. As a matter of 
fact, all the eight case studies presented here go beyond such a functional-
ist reading, and therefore manage to touch upon crucial issues that emerge 
by reading realities of decentralisation through theoretical concepts such as 
those introduced above.
To start with the obvious: the citizens, local people, the voters – those who 
are to receive, through decentralisation, a greater voice in shaping their 
future – are indeed a very heterogeneous category. We often find a highly 
stratified, complex, often competing local social reality (e.g. settlers and 
indigenous people in Bolivia, diverse groups in Assam, or forest owners 
and non-owners in Pakistan). These groups can not be encompassed with a 
notion such as ‘community’ – indeed, they may be ‘communities of place’, 
but not necessarily ‘communities of interests’. And their expectations of, 
and stakes in, decentralisation differ. State decentralisation (and specifically 
devolution) is to empower the local level, but as ‘the locals’ are socially het-
erogeneous, decentralisation becomes inherently contested. 
Heterogeneity, though, is not a privilege of the local. The notion of the state, 
too, requires closer analysis – along the vertical line, for example. Indeed, 
higher-level authorities are often inclined to allow for more flexibility or 
resource distribution in decentralisation (e.g. the water authorities in Mex-
ico or the Viceministry of Biodiversity, Environment and Forest Resources 
in Bolivia). Coming closer to local levels, or the “trenches” (see Corbridge 
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2008 above), intentions of the “commanding heights of the state” (Corbridge 
2008) get translated into more profane actions (e.g. linking planning issues 
with political elections in Buenos Aires, or shooting the cattle of people dis-
placed by national parks in Nepal). But heterogeneity exists along the hori-
zontal line as well. Efforts at organising decentralised governance structures 
can be undertaken by different sections of the bureaucracy, and can at times 
lead to overlapping structures at the local level (e.g. the multiplicity of struc-
tures in the Bolivian lowlands). 
We then move on to re-visit the relationship between state and people. 
Decentralisation is based on the assumption that citizens ‘exist’ – but inhow-
far can we take for granted that people consider themselves as being func-
tionally related to the state and thus perceive themselves as being citizens? 
Or, under which conditions are they ready to do so? Though well intended, 
many people in Assam, for example, experience decentralisation as a threat, 
and look for other forms of identity (e.g. Barbora’s notion of “peoplehood”; 
see also the insights from Pakistan). 
A further dimension emerges from Scott’s thoughts: indeed, decentralisa-
tion schemes at times follow standardised or simplified (Scott’s term) 
procedures, with the same rules and regulations extended throughout the 
state’s national territory (e.g. water management in Mexico, decentralisa-
tion through municipalities in Bolivia, or joint forest management in Paki-
stan). Though these procedures may fit local circumstances in some cases, 
they may encounter very different social (and at times ecological) realities 
in many others. As a consequence, they offer no room to local complexities 
(e.g. buffer zones in Nepal). 
Standardised procedures, however, do not lead to standardised applications. 
Several of the studies presented in this volume impressively illustrate the 
dimension of agency. In an agency-based conceptualisation of social reali-
ties, both governmental and non-governmental schemes emerge as resour-
ces to be used. Access to a forest management committee (in Pakistan, or in 
Bolivia’s lowlands) opens opportunities for income; being linked to a spe-
cific church gives access to drinking water supplies (e.g. in Kerala); or being 
a member of a certain ethnic group defines patterns of access to forest and 
public financial resources as shown in the case of Bolivia.
Agency, though, is not a commodity equally distributed, but is socially 
contingent. Capabilities to access decentralisation schemes are influenced 
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(though not determined) by social status, ethnic affiliation, political liaisons 
or simply by geographical distance. The opportunities offered by decentrali-
sation, thus, are not the same for all (see the studies from Pakistan, Assam 
and Bolivia).
We also showed that socially constructed notions of state citizenship and 
unequal distribution of agency are often linked to actor-specific notions 
of society–nature relationships. Therefore part of the complexity of local 
arenas is due to the fact that the process of negotiating socially, economi-
cally and culturally defined interests also implies to negotiate and make 
more compatible the ways in which societies wish to be related to their natu-
ral foundations, expressed in what they perceive as ‘nature’. This becomes 
especially important when ‘customary rights’ are being recognised as in the 
case of the lowlands in Bolivia or Nepal, or when they are ignored as in the 
case of Pakistan.
1.6  The dilemmas and challenges of decentralisation
The contributions to this volume illustrate in various ways the complexities 
of decentralisation – complexities that become visible when reading ground 
realities through contemporary social science discourses. They show how 
well-intended and generally taken-for-granted efforts at providing equal 
opportunities to improve livelihoods through decentralisation, after meeting 
local complexities, result in the emergence of often unintended dynamics 
 – different from the initial policy intentions. The analyses presented here are 
helping us to see that understanding such unintended effects only in terms 
of not having ‘decentralised enough’, or as procedural problems, might be 
a trap. What our reflections sustain is that the unintended effects are often 
expressions of encounters with complex, heterogeneous and conflictual 
local socio-political realities. A key challenge for research is to unravel 
these complexities and to highlight the variety of encounters decentralisa-
tion ventures can have with everyday realities. The eight studies presented 
here indeed illustrate the richness of insights that a differentiated analysis 
produces. 
At this stage, though, researchers are often asked by practitioners to suggest 
ways of how negative consequences of decentralisation can be mitigated, 
and how opportunities could be strengthened in order to – to recall Cham-
bers (introduced at the beginning of this paper) – cross the bridge between 
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critique and practice. Here, the insights presented by the researchers in this 
volume indicate a conflictuous terrain. 
In a first reading, a core suggestion may emerge that calls upon decentrali-
sation endeavours to better account for (local) complexity – for example to 
modify the often standardised procedures in such a way that they allow for 
flexibility, incorporation of local peculiarities and even constructive feed-
back loops between policy-making and local experience. 
However, there is another side to this coin, well illustrated in several of the 
papers (e.g. Bolivia, Assam or Kerala): Heterogeneity also favours compe-
tition for the often scarce resources and opportunities available locally, and 
access to these is reorganised through decentralisation. This competition can 
lead to the proactive and strategic construction of differences between and 
among local social entities. As a result, there are processes of ‘othering’; they 
can take modest forms (e.g. lowlands of Bolivia) or they can escalate and even 
lead to bloodshed and misery as the case of Assam dramatically shows. 
Such radical cases can initiate a rethinking of assumptions, positions and 
normative outlooks. As the examples of Kerala and the Bolivian lowlands 
(and to some extent Pakistan, Mexico and Argentina) illustrate and argue, 
there is – in principle – an important and crucial role for the state. As already 
noticed by Ribot in his point No. 4: “For effective decentralisation, central 
governments remain important ‘for redressing inequities and preventing 
elite capture of public decision-making processes. Central government also 
must establish the enabling legal environment for organising, representation, 
rights, and recourse so that local people can demand government respon-
sibility, equity, and justice for themselves.’ Central governments should 
also ensure ‘pro-poor, pro-minority action’” (Ribot 2002, p 3). Similarly, 
as mentioned above, Slater (2002, p 255) urged to avoid the “accentuation 
of the dominant and a romanticisation of the resistant”: though criticised for 
being simplified, often inefficient and bureaucratic, politically motivated 
and often insensitive approaches towards local complexities, it is – again in 
principle – the state that is meant to ‘balance local complexities’, to avoid 
processes of ‘othering’, and to secure equal access to natural and socio-
economic resources. As the Kerala paper argues along this line, “it is only 
within the arena of ‘contestational politics and of the conflicts of ideas and 
interests that are an essential part of democracy’ [in the context of the nation-
state], that development can take place – and decentralisation can be a core 
instrument in this” (see also the conclusions of Bottazzi [2009]).
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The dilemma, then, is between an understanding of decentralisation that sup-
ports this envisioned role of a deeply democratic state on the one hand, and 
the fears of decentralisation being “constitutional engineering”, the “almost 
naïve faith in the ability of constitutional arrangements to resolve complex 
(and contentious) issues centred on identity” on the other hand (Barbora 2009 
on Assam). This also relates to the paradox we encountered when discussing 
Scott (see above), in that decentralisation may aim to overcome simplified 
views of ‘the local’ held by central governments living at a great distance from 
local heterogeneity, but in practice the ways in which central governments 
design and implement decentralisation often follow blueprints themselves 
which are too simplistic to effectively respond to local heterogeneity.
Thus, there is no simple answer as to ‘how to do things right’. What our 
insights highlight is that decentralisation is, by its very basic intentions, 
a highly political venture – and thus contingent by definition. What has 
become evident from our studies is that decentralisation is much more than 
the introduction of “new mechanisms” (see Gaventa 2002); as a matter of 
fact, it can trigger the establishment of new social arenas in which the differ-
ent actors involved do not behave according to pre-conceived (functionalist) 
roles. As the cases of Bolivia, Assam or Nepal show, these arenas lead to a 
re-construction of very basic notions such as citizenship, even the mean-
ing of the state, and of the interactions between local actors, policy-makers, 
NGOs or social movements.
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